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Introduction 
In 1938 and 1939, the Rockefeller Foundation organized two confidential conferences 
“On the Interpretation of the Natural Sciences for a General Public”, commissioned an 
exhaustive survey of contemporary science popularization in the United States and actively 
participated in international efforts in this direction under the auspices of the Paris-based 
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. The two 
confidential conferences gathered a significant part of the scientific, social scientific and mass 
media elites of the United States, and were conceived as an informal think tank in which the 
participants were asked to privately and frankly discuss over the political goals, strategies and 
techniques of science popularization. 
The transcripts of the Rye conferences offer a privileged vantage point on the debates 
that the scientific community was having at a time in which the rise of mass communications 
was changing the forms and functions of science popularization
1
, and compel historians to re-
examine the politics of science popularization in the United States in the 1930s. Scientists, 
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business and the state feature in most of the standard accounts of the history of science 
popularization in the 1930s, but there is an actor that is usually missing: philanthropic 
institutions.  
The role played by the Rockefeller Foundation in using science as a geopolitical tool in 
Latin America and in defining research agendas and shaping scientific disciplines in the United 
States is well known
2, but we didn’t know yet about its interest in shaping science 
popularization as a means of social control. This interest of the Rockefeller Foundation in 
science popularization should be understood at the intersection of two of its main interests in the 
late 1930s: science and mass communications. The two main characters behind it were John 
Marshall, the Associate Director of its Humanities Division, and Warren Weaver, the Director 
of its Natural Sciences Division. They conceived the conference as a chance to explore a topic 
that had been informally discussed among Foundation’s officers and which fitted very well 
within the Foundation’s new program in the 1930s. 
The deep social and political unrest caused by the Depression made the Rockefeller 
Foundation reorient its policy towards “present and pressing human needs” and what Lily Kay 
has called “a science of social control”3. In the natural sciences this meant a shift from physical 
to biological sciences, especially molecular biology, in the rise as a discipline of which Warren 
Weaver played an instrumental role. In Humanities, the new program of the 1930s meant a shift 
from the “cloistered kind of research” of scholarly archaeology and philology to studies of “the 
ways in which the American public now gains its culture”4. John Marshall was instrumental in 
fostering and shaping the emerging field of mass communications research and in helping 
redefine propaganda as an acceptable and “democratic” psychological warfare tool for 
engineering mass consent during –and after- World War II5. 
 
Science and Democracy: the First Conference “On the Interpretation of the Natural 
Sciences for a General Public”  
 In June 15th 1938, Warren Weaver spoke at the Westchester County Club in Rye, New 
York, in front of a distinguished audience of first-rank scientists that had shown some interest in 
popularization and fellow officers from several divisions of the Rockefeller Foundation
6
. 
Weaver opened his informal introductory remarks quoting a toast by Stalin and thus explicitly 
striking the political key from the very beginning:  
“I don’t think that any of you gentlemen will be shocked if, for the first setting of the topic that 
we have before us, I quote a toast which was recently given by Stalin. It seems a rather curious 
place to go to, to get a key sentence for such an inquiry as this, and from some points of view 
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one might say that our topic would be the exploration of what we would like to mean by this 
toast as compared possibly with what Stalin meant by it. It was on May 19th at a meeting in 
Moscow when Stalin gave this toast: ‘To science, to its flourishing, to the health of the men of 
science. To the flourishing of science, that science which does not segregate itself from the 
people, but is ready to serve the people and transmit to the people all the conquests of science; 
science which serves the people, not under compulsion but voluntarilly, willingly’”7.  
 It surely didn’t surprise the participants. After the crash of 1929 more and more voices 
were questioning the validity of the 1920s science-based corporate capitalism’s ideology that 
linked “pure science”, corporate monopolies and the free enterprise system8. Science and 
technology were both blamed and invoked as either Depression’s cause or remedy, and science 
popularization came to be seen as an increasingly important cultural tool by many actors with 
different political agendas
9
.  
One of these actors were big science-based corporations, that reacted to the threat posed 
by the Depression with a renewed insistence in spreading this ideology. In many World’s Fairs, 
advertising campaigns, films, broadcasts and displays, science was an essential part of their 
marketing and public relations strategies. Shows like General Motor’s Parade of Progress hit 
the American roads to present the more spectacular features of new discoveries and propagate 
the good news that science was going to create more jobs
10
.  
 Another actor was the scientific community itself. Although a good part of it remained 
as conservative as in the 1920s, historian Peter Kuznick has shown how in the late 1930s there 
was a significant process of political radicalization of the American scientific community, that 
led to the creation of institutions like the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual 
Freedom (ACDIF) and the American Association of Scientific Workers (AASW). Influenced by 
the lively debates aroused within the British Association for the Advancement of Science by the 
agitation of the marxist group of first-rank British scientists known as the “visible college”, left-
wing American scientists shaped the policies of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (AAAS) in the direction of devoting more energies to a general discussion of the 
social effects of science and to popularization of science, which came to be seen by some of 
them, like Walter B. Cannon, as a means of fighting racism and fascism by debunking their 
irrational myths and spreading among the population the ability to think autonomously and 
rationally
11
. 
The officers of the Rockefeller Foundation were perfectly aware of the incipient 
realigning of political loyalties in the scientific community and set themselves to keep track of 
this left turn in order to contain it if it got to the point of going beyond proper limits
12
. And they 
were also perfectly aware of the renewed emphasis in the social consequences of science and in 
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popularization that was taking place within the AAAS. Organizing the two-day confidential 
conference was their way of joining and shaping the debate on popularization as a civic duty 
started within the scientific community. 
Warren Weaver thought of this new awareness of social responsibility as the point of 
departure for reflection, and started his intervention ringing a bell of alarm in front of the 
criticisms to science that came even from within the scientific community. It was not only that 
the marxist group of British scientists were displaying exhibitions such as one called 
Frustrations of Science, in which the argument that capitalism was restraining the positive 
potential of science was visually defended using panels and statistical charts. What was really 
alarming was the fact that even respectable journals such as Nature were acknowledging the 
dark side of the scientific enterprise (technological unemployment, alienation, pollution, etc.) 
and urging scientists to be aware of their social mission. 
 The debates at the conference were much more complex and diverse than what it is 
possible to sum up here
13
, but two issues kept appearing again and again: whether it was the 
method or the results and applications of science that which had to be popularized, on the one 
hand, and which was the relationship between science and democracy, on the other. The favored 
view by most scientists –although heavily contested by sociologist William Ogburn- was that 
the scientific method was what had to be popularized. The issue of science and democracy was 
more controversial. Considerable disagreement occurred regarding what democracy was and 
what relation science had -or ought to had- with democracy in the US. Positions ranged from 
astronomer Harlow Shapley’s defense of scientific habit of thought as a rational tool for fighting 
authoritarianism and keeping democracy alive, to outspoken eugenicist and filofascist claims by 
biologist Clarence Little. Most participants stood a middle ground. “Is this conference 
committed to the espousal of a free democracy?”, asked Harlow Shapley in the midst of a 
vibrant discussion on the relationship between science and democracy, to which Warren Weaver 
emphatically replied: “Not in the least!”. “We are not committed to anything”, added the 
chairman of the session, biologist Oscar Riddle
14
.  
 The officers of the Rockefeller Foundation were not unhappy with the lack of a definite 
and common answer to these issues, since they conceived the conferences mainly as a 
“ceremony of getting attention for the subject and recognition of its importance from influential 
people who ought to feel some concern about it”15. 
In particular, the Rockefeller Foundation was actively interested in framing the 
intellectual debate in general political terms, which had basically to do with the preservation of 
social relations. Did science popularization promote social stability? During the 1939 
conference, sociologist and political scientist Harold Lasswell (who eventually became during 
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WWII the Chief of the Rockefeller-funded Experimental Division for the Study of War Time 
Communications at the Library of Congress) posed the question of the relationship between 
science and democracy in terms of “anxiety reactions” and “attitudes towards authority”. Were 
these fostered or mitigated by science popularization? To what extent could an improved 
science popularization act as a social balsam? In fact, it was John Marshall who explicitly 
suggested the content and terminology of Lasswell’s intervention some days prior to the 
conference
16
. His goal was to make the participants to the second Rye conference think in 
science popularization in broad political terms as a social stabilizer beyond their narrower 
professional activities. 
Warren Weaver was inclined to think that the answer to Lasswell’s question was 
positive, provided that popularization focused on values and method and portrayed science as a 
habit of thought, not as the latest applications and consumer gadgets, which were actually the 
most blatantly controversial parts of science. The Rockefeller Foundation conceived a 
popularization of science focused on method and values as a middle ground that could avoid 
both the explicitly political talk on the social consequences of science of the radicalized leftist 
scientists and the triumphalist gadget-centered propaganda promoted by big corporations. 
 Now the question was how to popularize this particular vision of science so that it could 
act as a social stabilizer, which was something it had been consciously left aside in the first 
conference. The answer would have to do with mass communications, a field in which the 
Rockefeller Foundation had a vital interest. 
 
Mass Media and the Popularization of Science: the 1939 Conference “On the 
Interpretation of the Natural Sciences for a General Public” 
 Right after the first conference, planning began for a second one that had to gather mass 
media professionals and executives to explore what was their feeling of how science could best 
be popularized. In preparation for this conference, the Rockefeller Foundation commissioned 
Watson Davis, the Director of the scientific news agency Science Service, to conduct a 
confidential survey “on current efforts to interpret the natural sciences to the general public”, 
which was probably the first of its kind ever. Newspapers, magazines, books, radio, motion 
pictures and exhibits covering the first nine months of 1938 were carefully and exhaustively 
surveyed and analyzed during the last three months of that year. The main result of the detailed 
quantitative analysis of these several media was that science was interpreted to the public 
mainly in an indirect way, through advertising and non-scientific programs, rather than in the 
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formally organized scientific programs. The ad with a vitamin appeal and the movie 
fictionalizing a doctor were the main sources of science education for the masses
17
. 
The survey was an important working document for the follow-up two-day conference 
that was jointly organized by most of the divisions of the Foundation in June 1939 also at the 
Westchester County Club in Rye. Again, it was small, informal and confidential, and it was 
chaired by the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Raymond Fosdick. This time the 
participants were big names of the social sciences and the mass media (both policy making 
executives and practitioners)
18
. 
During the interwar years, the mass media (particularly radio) were emerging 
powerfully, and parallel to it, there were many efforts to understand and control them. The 
Rockefeller Foundation was at the vanguard of these efforts, an emblematic example of which 
was the Princeton Radio Project, a research project into the social effects of radio that started in 
1937 and was led, among others, by sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld and psychologist Hadley 
Cantril. Interested and worried at the same time for the use of mass media in Nazi Germany, 
where Goebbels was experimenting and achieving spectacular results in relation to political 
control, the Rockefeller Foundation’s interest in mass communications grew as World War II 
approached. When the war broke out in Europe, the newly formed Communications Seminar 
used the results of the Princeton Radio Project in order to deal with the problem of propaganda, 
and acted under John Marshall’s coordination as an unofficial arm of the State for devising the 
psychological warfare policies that were supposed to shift American public opinion from 
isolationism to interventionism
19
. 
The Soviets and the Nazis were showing signs of a greater efficiency and ability to 
mobilize their populations for total war. How to be as efficient as them in using the mass media 
without loosing democracy? How to maintain social control in emergency times? How to create 
a propaganda that was both efficient and democratic? This were the questions that were being 
discussed by the very same people (Harold Lasswell, John Marshall, Hadley Cantril, Ivor A. 
Richards, Donald Slesinger) that had met just some months before in Rye to discuss the political 
goals of science popularization. We should read the Rockefeller Foundation’s approach to 
science popularization in the 1930s as shaped by all these efforts at systematically studying the 
mechanisms of mass media, and as shaped by similar concerns with social stability. 
 The topics discussed at the second conference ranged from the relationship between 
education and entertainment, or science in documentary films, to discussions over the current 
popularization efforts in several mass media, but the central issues ended up being audience 
research and the training of able “middlemen” to interpret science to the public.  
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There was a general agreement that more audience research was needed both to appraise 
what was the public’s image of science and to find out how did the public react to the messages 
conveyed by the mass media. In his intervention at the conference, psychologist Hadley Cantril 
used some preliminary results out of the Princeton Radio Project to assess the possible audience 
for science in radio. He presented the socioeconomical characterization of the radio audience, 
and suggested that the best way to proceed in science interpretation would be to imitate the 
successful methods in mass communication. Watson Davis agreed to this point of view:  
“In injecting science into the thought-stream of the public, it will be more effective to adapt 
science interpretation to the methods of the medium rather than to attempt to revolutionize the 
medium selected. The scientific revolution for which we hope will come through infiltration 
rather than by didactic upheaval”20. 
 The idea that prevailed at the conference, and to which the Rockefeller Foundation was 
committed, was that the public’s ability to absorb science had mainly to do with its presentation. 
Form was what needed to be improved in science communication. And therefore any eventual 
practical efforts should be directed towards achieving a more skilled presentation of science.   
 Many of the debates at the second conference were indeed about scientific popularizers. 
The participants discussed topics such as the role played by the scientific news agency Science 
Service, the work and training of scientific journalists -increasingly organized around the 
recently founded Association of Scientific Writers- or the actual training of radio scriptwriters 
that dealt with science contents. In one of the many debates in this sense, several of the 
participants wondered whether it was better to establish a training program in science 
popularization in the radio aimed at young scientists at college level or to improve the scientific 
training of journalists
21
.  
Most of the participants at the second conference agreed that able “middlemen” were 
needed if science was to be successfully popularized in the mass media. These “middlemen” 
were conceived by the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation as mediators between the 
scientists and the public, someone who could “interpret” or “translate” the language of science 
to the language of the masses so that it still transmitted information both  on the contents and 
results of scientific research and –tacitly- on the method and values of science. Warren Weaver 
clearly understood the “middlemen”’s task within the top-down lineal model of 
popularization
22
: 
“In this artistic problem of reaching people, you have to remember that they have their own 
idiom and their own prejudices. That is extremely important. There are many means that we can 
use to avoid doing violence to their idiom and to their prejudice and gradually get them to see 
our own point of view, to correct their own misinterpretations. [...] It would be a great thing, 
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wouldn’t it, if some way or other society was spontaneously blessed with a scientific equivalent 
of Walt Disney?”23 
 In fact, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Humanities Division had been working in this 
direction since 1935 regarding mass communications. In the museum field, for example, the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s program of allocations and grant-in-aids had been mainly channeled 
through money for studies of techniques of display and for training personnel in these 
techniques
24
. Dozens of interns were trained in places like the Brooklyn Museum of Art, the 
Buffalo Museum of Science or the New York Museum of Science and Industry. The 
Rockefeller Foundation was thus instrumental in what has been called the “communicative 
turn” in museum display in the United States25.  
The Rockefeller Foundation officers organized the confidential conferences on science 
popularization with the working hypothesis that in the case the Foundation eventually decided 
to get involved in any significant way in the field of science popularization, the most useful way 
wouldn’t be to create a new internal Division nor to fund a new external organization in this 
line, but to keep acting as a think tank and, most importantly, to promote awareness for the need 
of training programs for journalists, scriptwriters, broadcasters and curators 
Facing the rise of a new cultural industry, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation 
thought that the best course of action to turn science popularization into an efficient tool for 
social control was to shape the training of the key element in the codification and transmission 
of many of the scientific messages that would get to the public: the “middlemen” of science. 
  
 
 
Conclusions: the Rockefeller Foundation and the Politics of Science Popularization 
In September 1939, a conference on science popularization was supposed to take place 
in Paris. It was the second one organized by the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation of the 
League of Nations, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation
26
. John Marshall and Warren 
Weaver were supposed to attend the conference, but the war broke out and aborted their travel 
plans. It also aborted the Rockefeller Foundation’s interest in science popularization. More 
urgent things were ahead.  
Even though the whole interest in popularization had been a “gamble” for Rockefeller 
Foundation officers
27
, and the money spent in it was a modest quantity according to their 
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standards, they had shown enough interest in the topic to organize two confidential conferences, 
commission a private survey and participate in an international effort. As late as 1943, John 
Marshall still thought that there was still work to do in this field, and hoped that after the war 
the Rockefeller Foundation would be able to keep stimulating thought on the subject
28
. 
But the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation had already achieved one of their main 
goals, which was to to put the topic in the intellectual agenda of key influential scientists and 
media men. During the second Rye conference, Warren Weaver quoted a letter by Gerald 
Wendt, in charge of the science and education contents at the 1939 New York World’s Fair, in 
which he claimed that he had used the transcript of the first conference as a guide in his work. 
Despite the fact that the overall approach of the World’s Fair to the popularization of science 
had been dominated by corporate design, this letter was for Weaver the proof that “the thinking 
of the people who attended that conference was very definitely reoriented by their attendance at 
that conference”29. 
How influential were the conferences “On the Interpretation of the Natural Sciences for 
a General Public” and the Rockefeller Foundation’s approach to popularization in the postwar 
period? More research is needed for this question to be properly addressed, but the answer 
might have to do with Warren Weavers’ efforts in this direction. Historian Bruce Lewenstein 
has pointed to the key role that Warren Weaver played in shaping post-WWII “public 
understanding of science” in the United States through his work at the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, the Council for the Advancement of Science Writing, and the 
National Science Foundation
30
. His active involvement in the 1938 and 1939 Rye conferences 
seems to indicate that many of his postwar concerns should be traced back to the interwar period 
and reassessed in the light of the 1930s battle over the popularization of science. 
In any case, the Rockefeller Foundation is an actor which needs to be added to the 
historiographical picture of the politics of science popularization in the United States in the 
1930s. 
I argue that the interest of the Rockefeller Foundation in science popularization has to 
be placed at the crossroads of two different but interrelated key elements in the struggle for 
cultural hegemony in the United States: science and the mass media. An intelligent management 
of mass communications was perceived as crucial for social stability. And science 
popularization was not only a very sensitive political issue at that time, but also an area which 
offered the Rockefeller Foundation an ideal case study for strategic thinking in mass 
communications, since it allowed cooperation between all its Divisions in a field the officers 
knew very well from first-hand experience. 
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At a time in which there was an incipient professionalization process going on in the 
field of science popularization, the Rockefeller Foundation’s officers thought that their best way 
to shape this process was to bring the topic into the attention of key individuals, and eventually 
to promote training programs for a new kind of  middlemen of science that had to create a new 
popular science adapted to a new cultural industry, one which shouldn’t have the overtly 
political tones of the radicalized leftist scientists nor the triumphalist and gadget-centered 
propaganda of the big technoscientific corporations, but would focus on the morally uplifting 
values of the scientific method as a way to preserve the social order.
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